A talk with the professor of International Relations and a Jean Monnet Chair at the Middle East Technical University, Attila Eralp, offers the opportunity of broadening the perspective and view of the constantly changing international scene and of issues usually defined in a rigid context, particularly with regards the Cyprus issue. The professor explores Turkey’s role in the area and its efforts to become a regional key-power in the EU-Atlantic relations. The scene in the region which is constantly molded, Turkey’s hanging step between European the USA and the slow-down of its accession process clearly affect the negotiations process for the solution of the Cyprus problem but also the very same position of Cyprus within the EU. Professor Eralp is the Chairman of the Department of International Relations at the Middle Ease Technical University in Ankara with a particular academic interest in Turkey’s relations with the EU.
Q: How do you see Turkey’s position in today’s international environment in relation to Turkey’s aspirations to become a regional player?
A: Observing the international system the return of geopolitics and evidence is this summer of what happened with Georgia and the Russian intervention and invasion of that part of Caucasian. And the return of geopolitics there is an increasing role for Turkey and its position. We all know where it is located. The important question is how to use that geopolitical position to the advantage of Turkey to the advantage of Turkish lets say foreign policy orientation and also in terms of Turkey’s EU accession process.
In the Georgian conflict Turkey played quite a positive role. It suggested a new initiative which was characterised as a new stability and cooperation platform. A regional kind of initiative among regional countries: Russia, Georgia Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey. What is interesting about this initiative is that first of all is a major kind of initiative and as you know in Caucasus there are all kinds of frozen conflicts. I think that the Turkish initiative was quite valuable from that point of view.
In the international system all these frozen conflicts have the possibility to escalate into hard core conflicts. But we will see because the Turkish regional initiative depends on the solution of two major problems in the region: one is Turkey’s relations with Armenia and the second one is Nagorno-Karabakh which is the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. If those conflicts remain unsolved it is quite difficult to have regional stability because the Turkish initiative is based on a more on infrastructure relations and a deeper understanding. It’s based on the European idea of having more functional relations but it is difficult to have these functional relations in the middle of conflicts you know. But Turkey is forwarding this initiative and is in the process of normalising the relations with Armenia and this is the most interesting part as I believe is in the right direction to normalise relations in the Caucasus. And this could help in the solution of frozen conflicts in time. So in the Caucasus I think recently Turkey is playing an important role and we will see how this role develops and this let’s see if this multilateral scheme of cooperation and stability can form.
In the last decade or so Turkish foreign policy has become more and more Europeanised. There is a certain European orientation and style. In terms of style in terms of format Turkey is emphasizing not that hard military kind of options but mostly diplomatic multilateral options. So it is in line with the European Union foreign policy making. In the recent Progress Report by the European Commission on Turkey under foreign policy chapters there is a positive assessment of Turkey’s contribution to all these regional initiatives and Turkey’s role in the Middle East and the Caucasus and also this process of normalisation. When you look at this report from a greater perspective - since 1998- you can see the progress in terms of reporting on foreign policy regarding Turkey.
The relations with the neighbours started to change dramatically in the last decade, starting with Greece Bulgaria, even when you go to the East Turkey’s relations with Iran, with Syria for example. Two remaining problems are the Cyprus one and the Armenia one.
Q: Within this context and perspective, as well as in view of Turkey’s efforts maybe to become a regional player a stability regional factor how important do you think is the solution or the non solution of the Cyprus problem? How does it fit in Turkey’s plans?
A: As an academic I can say that the solution of the Cyprus anyway is important as Turkey can have much better relations with its neighbours. Cyprus remains one of the most serious problems. And because of Cyprus Turkey can not take part in the CFSP of the EU. There are all kinds of let’ s say dialogues between the EU and Turkey but institutionally speaking can not take part in the CFSP since it’s not a member it’s not possible but there all kind of different levels of cooperation. But for example because of the Cyprus problem Turkey can not open the negotiation chapter on CFSP, which is quite unfortunate as we have been discussing Turkey’s foreign policy and its role in the region, and it’s orientations are in line with Turkey’s orientations.
The non solution of the problem, blocks Turkey’s more meaningful and I would say crucial participation in forms of political dialogue in the EU and also of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, which is very important in the Caucasus the Med region. Turkey is invisible in that policy as well; it is not a partner in that policy. But we also know that there are frictions between EU and NATO because of the Cyprus problem. As a result of the non solution of the Cyprus problem we see all these frictions. In a way the Republic of Cyprus is using its veto right over its issues and Turkey uses other means also. So if the Cyprus problem remains unsolved it will be quite difficult for EU and Turkey to have a meaningful institutional mechanism, which is extremely important.
I have been suggesting for a while that now that Turkey should be included institutionally speaking in the CFSP even before full membership. When you look at Turkey’s environment Turkey’s contribution is essential within this respect and Turkey should be brought in the CFSP and there are all kinds of discussions in Europe about this meaning that actors in Europe would like to bring more Turkey in to CFSP and it will be in the benefit of Turkey and the EU as we have the discussion of the return of geopolitics and the regional problems and the EU also wants to be a more of a geopolitical actor now and faces all those challenges and Turkey’s contribution could be important. And there are many in Turkey who would also like to have closer relations with the EU on CFSP matters. In that respect the solution of the Cyprus Problem again is essential.
An extremely important question is what kind of a regional player would Turkey like to be? Is Turkey going to be a regional actor in a unilateral way or in a multilateral way? Is Turkey in this process will ally just with the EU or with USA and other actors? If Turkey stays in the EU accession process there is a great possibility and it’s obvious that Turkey will come closer to EU on these regional matters and there will be more dialogue etc and Turkey will be part of the EU institutional structure. Or if Turkey is not part of the EU system then Turkey could be regional actor in its own right. There will be several options there. It could ally itself with other regional actors such as Russia and there are all kinds of new developments in the region. Or it could be allies with the USA you know. But since Turkey is in the EU process now I think that the most viable option for Turkey is to continue to work closely with the EU on these matters. When I look at Turkey’s foreign policy orientation in terms of format and type it’s coming closer to the EU positions. But there are some reform problems and the Cyprus problem also.
Q: There is a big discussion about the slow-down of the reform process and there seems to be a lot of disappointment internally in Turkey about the process but also within Europe there seems to be some kind of a standstill. Does this affect Erdogan’s position in Turkey? Is he loosing the support he originally had drawn from the powers that supported him?
A: First of all the procedure is affected by what happent to Europe. In 2004-2005 Europe was involved in its own institutional problems, the Constitutional Treaty was not ratified and the Lisbon Treaty was not ratified and the enlargement issues became contested issues in all kinds of frictions and we have seen the rise of all these debates in Europe. And the Turkish accession was challenged by crucial actors such as Germany and especially France. One could say that the turning hands were extremely important and the negative statements of President Sarkozy on Turkey and they provocated (1858) and created a bitter environment on Turkey. And in relation to that also the change in Germany was quite critical. We remember the German attitude after Helsinki in 1999 and there is now a change in German attitude because of the social democratic coalition and this new attitude towards Turkey this is extremely important and also the Greek attitude was extremely important in a more inclusionary attitude in the candidate status of Turkey and in the start of negotiations.
But as Turkey started negotiations again a change in Germany to the negative let’s say in France and Greece became more and more silent on the Turkish issue and on what’s going on in Cyprus. So as we look at the changes in Europe I think they affected Turkey quite negatively.
Domestically speaking we started having all kinds of elections in the last couple of years national and general and now local. When you are in an election environment you turn to domestic politics and there are all kinds of issues in the domestic agenda and the opposition starts to exploit some of these. And also you should take into consideration that as a result of the referenda in Cyprus the Cyprus issue became an explosive issue in the domestic agenda in Turkey and the opposition started to challenge the government saying that the government has made many concessions and has gained anything in return.
EU stand is complex and is not always is easy to understand all the complexity of the issue. Probably the government party in the beginning they were unable to grasp all the complexities of the issue and in a way as we were discussing last night it seems that there is an agreement on slowing down the process both in Turkey and in Europe.
One of the difficulties in the Turkish negotiations is that it is more imposed by political factors in comparison to other accessions, even when Turkey negotiates more technical chapters such as the one on education and culture which is so easy. The Turkish negotiations you know started with the characterisation that Turkey is meeting the Copenhagen criteria sufficiently not fully. The expectation was that you know that this characterisation will be overcoming a cross final path that it was used in 2004. And thought that 23328 Turkey and EU will overcome this partnership problem and in a year’s time or two year’s time the political criteria will not intervene in the negotiations. But when you look at this progress report you will see that the same phrases were used on Turkey’s progress. Insufficient fulfilment and there are all kinds of problems in terms of the political criteria and political that intervene and the more technical chapters and then the whole negotiation becomes quite contested.
Q: How important is the landmark of the March 2009 local elections in Turkey, particularly in terms of maybe this consensus that was created in the past for Erdogan this dynamic that was created in the past. Do you think that these elections are important?
A: I don’t think local elections will not change this picture you know. The fact that the accession process is so undermined now to the very risk of the governing party to undermine the EU process, and they hardly do more in terms of reforms. I think the election process will be depended on what happens in terms of the Cyprus issue and in terms of Europe. For example in Europe if the Irish vote is a “yes”, and the Lisbon Reform Treaty is approved and if the EU solves its prolonged problems and if there is a return to the enlargement issues then there could be a certain opening. The second possibility is what happens here on the island. If the negotiations proceed well even if they don’t lead to an outcome soon but there is a climate of progress you know, and that could help the revitalisation of the Turkey- EU accession process and Turkey will seek the role of the USA in all of this. There will be a new president next year and the President will look at the Middle East and this Region, the Cyprus problem will not really be on the agenda but certainly he will have to work on all these critical matters and of course there will be a need for the Turkish contribution. So let’s see how the new USA will relate to Turkey and how that would affect Turkey’s relation to the EU.
The Bush administration, although it took the decision to support Turkey in the accession, it was counterproductive. So now we can have a more productive let’s say outlook in terms of US-European relations because for a long time the US-European relations were in problem so we will see how the US –European relations will change because I think that’s more important for the international situation think. The new administration of the US will change the relationship with Europe and it will put them better and more harmonious relationship and that is essential to solve some of the problems in the Middle East. And you need to have of more of that uniformity. That could help Turkey because if we have frictions in the relationship between the US and Europe and Turkey would be in the middle and it will be squeezed from both sides. On the contrary if there is a harmonious relationship between Turkey and the US that could help Turkey and also maybe in the solution of the Cyprus problem. Let’s see.
Q: According to your academic opinion on the next issue: After 2004 there seems to be a new-founded nationalism if we can call it that among the Turkish Cypriots. Do you think this is a new dimension to the efforts of the Cyprus problem? Do you think that this means that there is an additional key (to that of Turkey) within this context we talk about two keys now?
A: Your assessment is quite interesting in my opinion the key lies with the in the Greek part of the island rather than the Turkish part of the island or even on Turkey. Because yes you are right the non solution of the problem creates all kinds of nationalistic forces, Turkey, in the northern part of Cyprus. If the non solution is prolonged there is that possibility of having more of let’s say rise of nationalism. But you should also remember that in 2004 Turkey had a drastically changed its policy on Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots had a major dramatic change on that part of the island. What has happened since we should take into consideration really. Primarily because of the no vote in the Greek part of the island led to the non solution of the problem. Now I think that is absolute – everybody should work for a solution to the Cyprus problem (Turkey, Turkish Cypriots, the international community etc.) but it is more to the Greek Cypriots really at this point. If they want a solution then it is not difficult to reach a solution. I don’t know whether there is a solid commitment among the Greek Cypriots for a solution I observe the Turkish Cypriot side and there is definitely a strong commitment for the solution.
Q: What kind of a solution do you think Turkey would want within the context we discussed earlier – according to your academic opinion- and do you think within the same regional context we discussed do you think there is a change of dynamics in the relationship between the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey?
A: With regards the second part I think Turkish Cypriots and Turkey work closely at this point but for a more positive role really on the solution. This has been the case since 2003-2004 also it has the same attitude. There is a cross-relationship in the leadership in the northern part of Cyprus with Turkey. Then initiatives of the leadership in the Turkish part of the island they are supported by the Turkish government so I think there is a cross-cooperation. In terms of the first part I think it depends on the two communities on what kind of a solution. The two communities would discuss their understanding of a solution and then let’s Turkey or Greece would help –be the catalyst towards the solution. When I look at the basic Turkish orientations here I think they haven’t changed because since Turkey endorsed the UN plan I think the Turkish position is still at that point so there is a long acquis on the Cyprus let’s say negotiations. One can not cut off the previous efforts. I think the parameters of the solution are well known the basic issue here is that there is so much lack of confidence, trust or willingness of the leaderships and leaderships in different sides always like to use the negotiations for their own domestic purposes. I think these are the basic problems and at this time or after the result of what happened in the referenda, the Greek side finally started to realise they are in the EU, they are in a better position and it could use the time and the advantage to get let’s say concessions from Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots and so they are playing with time really. But I was saying yesterday it is quite dangerous the time could pass and one could miss an important opportunity. There is that kind of a danger. Because in the past Turkey made all these kind of mistakes. Thinking that time is on their side. Now when I look at the situation here in Cyprus it is worse on this side. So I think the solution is possible and all the parameters are there. It depends how the Greek Cypriots being a member of the EU they are in a better position and they should probably be more oriented towards a solution. Probably the EU catalyst is more of a peace process a process where you solve conflicts. You don’t live with conflicts when you are an EU member. Think of the tragic consequences of this, you are a new member and you have to think about this conflict all the time. Think of the benefits and prospects in the long-term: Cyprus in the EU, Greece in the EU and Turkey in the EU in a stable and safe environment all these actors working closely in the Eastern Mediterranean. Think of all the benefits advantages of that kind of a relationship. Probably a utopia at this stage but it could work.
to Katerina Gennari